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Crucial to the comparison of fixed versus flexible exchange rates
is the mechanism by which exchange rates are determined when governments
do not directly support currencies. The monetary approach to exchange
rate determination emphasized that an exchange rate is the relative
price of two currencies; the equilibrium rate being that which equates
desired and actual money stocks. Within this approach, both monetary
and real phenomena affect the equilibrium exchange rate through their
influence on the stock demand or supply for currencies. The fundamen
tal idea of the monetary approach is that an asset pricing model must be
used to examine exchange rate determination.
The incorporation of rational expectations into the monetary
approach has carried the concept of the exchange rate as a relative
asset price to its logical extreme. In doing so, however, the predic
tions of the simple monetary models are greatly altered. If the exchange
rate is the relative price of two assets, beliefs about the future value
of the exchange rate will be the determinant of the current rate of
exchange. The only mechanism by which real or monetary disturbances can
alter the current exchange rate is for these disturbances to alter ex
change rate expectations. For example, Kareken and Wallace (1977) show
that in a rational expectations model with no uncertainty (i.e., perfect
foresight), the exchange rate must be constant over time, regardless of
changes in currency supplies or output levels. Moreover, they show that
any constant exchange rate is an equilibrium time path. The links be
tween asset supplies and productivity levels, which were so direct in
the simple monetary approach, are totally absent in the Kareken and
Wallace model. As long as all economic agents believe that the future
value of the exchange rate will be constant, the current value of the
exchange rate will not respond to changes in productivity or asset supplies.
Essential to the Kareken and Wallace result that current distur
bances will not alter exchange expectations is the implicit assumption
that currencies are perfect substitutes.^ They assume perfect capital
mobility and no transactions demand for money. Money is held only as a
store of value, and - as capital is perfectly mobile - either currency
can perform this function equally well. It is not surprising, then,
that the relative price of perfect substitutes will be constant over
time. While Kareken and Wallace argue that it is ad hoc to postulate
country specific money demand functions, it is worthwhile to consider
what is meant by "domestic currency" versus the "stateless" money of the
Kareken and Wallace model. The fact that governments have the ability
to declare a particular form of money as legal tender and to restrict
the use of alternative forms of money serves to differentiate monies in
the eyes of asset holders. Note that declaring a particular form of
money as legal tender is not sufficient to cause national monies to be
imperfect substitutes as currencies of various Issues could circulate
within a particular country. But when there are capital controls —
restrictions on domestic holdings of foreign issued currency — or even
a probability of such controls, asset holders will not be indifferent to
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the composition of currencies within their portfolios. Thus, the
Kareken and Wallace results concerning the indeterminacy and constancy
of the exchange rate rely upon the assumption that capital controls
will never be imposed, i.e., the probability of exchange controls is
identically zero.
One purpose of this paper is to consider exchange rate determination
in a rational expectations model in which there is a positive probability
of capital controls in some future period. It is shown that exchange
rates are determinate and are responsive to both monetary and real dis
turbances in the manner suggested by the Monetary Approach. Further, as
the probability of controls tends to zero, the exchange rate remains
determinate. Only when capital controls are impossible (i.e., proba
bility zero) do the Kareken and Wallace results hold.
After considering exchange rate determination, we examine the
relative merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes. We
follow the approach developed by Lapan and Enders (1979) and Helpman
and Razin (1978) in which expected utility comparisons are the criterion
used to select the best exchange regime. Both of these papers use an
intergenerational model of the sort developed by Samuelson (1958). All
asset and commodity demand functions are derived from microeconomic be
havior, and all agents have rational expectations. Both papers consider
only the small country case. Domestics hold only domestic currency in
the Lapan and Enders paper, while currencies are "stateless" in the
Helpman and E^zin model. Here we consider the full range of currency
substitutability by allowing the probability of currency controls to
vary between zero and unity. As long as the probability of controls is
not zero, expected utility under the two exchange regimes differ. With
fixed rates, expected utility does not depend upon the degree of capital
mobility, but expected utility with flexible rates depends upon the
probability that controls irf.ll be imposed. We also show — in a two-
country model — that controls can increase expected utility so that
flexible exchange rates and an optimally selected probability of controls
will be preferred to fixed exchange rates, or to flexible rates with no
probability of controls.
The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section I we describe
the behavior of individual agents in the context of the standard
Samuelson consumption-loan model; we also derive the aggregate equili
brium conditions from individual optimizing behavior. In Section IX we
describe how the possibility of future capital controls affects the
current exchange rate in an otherwise determinate model. Section III
expands the analysis of Section II by assuming output in each country
follows a Markov process; hence, we analyze how real factors influence
exchange rate determination. Our principal results are that exchange
rates are responsive to real phenomena, but are not very sensitive to
the magnitude of the probability of controls, provided this probability
is non-zero. Section IV uses the results of previous sections and
shows that fixed rates are preferable to flexible rates if capital is
not mobile. Section V compares the two regimes when the probability of
controls is less than unity. It is demonstrated that the probability
of controls affects expected utility under flexible rates and that at
least one country will wish to choose a positive probability of capital
controls. Thus, not only is it implausable that capital controls will
never be imposed, it is also suboptimal. Conclusions and directions
for further research are contained in the final section,
I) The Basic Model
We employ a standard consumption-loan model. It is assumed that:
i) there are two countries - the U.S. and Germany.
ii) each country produces a single (identical) tradeable good.
iii) individuals in each country live for two periods, working in
the first, retired in the second.
iv) each generation in each country consists of the same number of
people; in any time period, two generations are alive - the
working, and the retired.
v) labor supply decisions are - for simplicity - exogenous; each
individual is assumed to supply one unit of labor.
vi) output in each country is linear in labor supply.
vii) an individual's utility depends upon (real) consumption in each
period; further, all individuals have identical, homothetic
preferences.
viii) commodities are not storeable.
ix) there are (given) outstanding stocks of each country's
currency; these currencies are the (only) stores of value.
x) under fixed exchange rates, it is believed (accurately) that
exchange rates will not change through time.
xi) under flexible exchange rates, the equilibrium exchange rate is
determined by market forces (recognizing the probability of
capital controls).
Consider a representative individual (i) of generation t; he is
born at t, supplies one unit of labor in this period, consumes in t and
(t+1). Let
(1) cj - denote consumption in t by individual i of generation t.
(2) ~ denote consumption in (t+1) by individual i of the t^
3 —i —igeneration. (C^, denote the corresponding variables for the
"foreign" country). The utility for this individual (i) is given
by:
(3) U(cJ, bJ)
It is assumed that the individual chooses current consumption (C^) after
his output (income) and current prices are known, but before next period's
prices are known.
We assume there are two currencies - dollars (D) and marks (M); the
outstanding stocks of each currency are given for all time (denoted D, M).
Under fixed exchange rates, the dollar/mark exchange rate, e is known for
all time, and equal to e; under flexible exchange rates, the current
dollar/mark exchange rate is e^, as determined by market conditions. In
general, today's exchange rate (e^) will depend upon expectations con
cerning next period's exchange rate assume throughout that
all expectations are rational in the sense that individual probability
distributions concerning coincide with the true distributions.
Under fixed exchange rates, the individual really has only one
decision to make - how much to spend (save) today, as the asset composi
tion of his savings is immaterial. On the other hand, under flexible
exchange rates, two decisions are needed: (i) how much to consume (save)
today; and (ii) how to allocate assets within the portfolio.
Let denote the dollar price of commodities at t; and let D^(M^)
be the dollars (marks) held by individual i of generation t. Then, if
is individual output, the asset constraint is:
(4) Pj{Q^ - cj) - dJ - >0.
and next period's consumption is given by:
(5) Dj + >0;
or, using (4) and assuming non-satiation:
= ''tWt - + <^+1 -
At t, P^, Q^, and are known» as is the joint distribution of
e. .,) — denoted by g ®t+l^ * Hence, at t, the individual chooses
"t+l-
cj, to maximize the expectation of (3), given (4), (6) and expec
tations:
(7) Max E
P,-(qJ - cj) + - e^)Mj
t+1
subject to (4). In (7), E[ ] denotes the expectation operator; the
expectation runs over ^t+1* Lagrangean for the optimization is
(8) L = E U(C^,
P,-(Q^ - cj) + - eX
t+1
+ X[P^(Q^ - C^> - e
t "t
P
t t
where e [0, —(Q^ - C^)]; note (e , - e )M^ is the capital gains
(losses) in dollars of mark holdings.
Optimizing over and yields:
P.
(9) E "i -1 P U.
t+1
- AP^ < 0
(10) E - Xe^ £ 0
J / ^
where (U2) reflects the marginal utility of current (future) consump
tion .
Throughout the paper we shall assume - as is consistent with homo-
thetic preferences - that the utility function is homogeneous (of degree
no larger than one) In its arguments; so that all partial derivatives are
homogeneous of the same (non-positive) degree in their arguments. This
implies that portfolio composition is independent of wealth. Let:
(11) = average propensity for current consumption.
(12) = P (qJ; - C^) = dollar wealth.
t t^t t
(13) m^ = (^t*^t/W^) - fraction of current wealth held in marks.
Then, given current prices (P^, output (Q^), and expectations, (9)
and (10) uniquely determine the individual's consumption demand and
demand for marks. Denote this solution by an * where, for convenience,
the superscript i is dropped. Thus,
(14) Cj.(P^, e^;
where the g( ) reflects the fact that expectations - as well as current
prices - enter this solution.
By assumption, all individuals have Identical preferences and
expectations, and face identical prices; hence, the solutions (14) are
the same for all individuals. Assuming there are N people in each genera
tion (in each country), and letting Q.(Q ) denote total domestic (foreign)
output, aggregate world demand of the new generation is given by:
(15) c*( )[Q^+Qj.];
Finally, the outstanding stock of dollars (marks) is given by D(M); since
no bequests are left, commodity market equilibrium yields:
(16) (e^M +D) = (1 - c*)Pj,(Q^ +Q^).
Given the fraction of wealth people wish to hold in marks, asset market
equilibrium becomes:
9(17) m*[P^(l - e*)(Q^ +
(17^) -.•ma)
where, in (16) and (17'), c , m depend on P^, e^. and expectations.
Hence, the equilibrium values of P and e are determined by D, M, and
c t
(Q^ + Qj.)» given expectations of analogy, the equilibrium
values of ^t+1 determined by D, M(assumed constant) and
(Q^^^ + given the expectations for (t + 2). Rational expectations
require that the expectations held by individuals at t are Ld.entical
with the true distributions of ®t+l determined above.
Having set the stage, we now turn to an analysis of exchange rate
determination. We consider first the case in which there are no exo
genous disturbances; in section III we then assume output in each period
is random.
II) Exchange Rate Determination and Capital Controls
In this section we assume there is no output uncertainty; hence
= Q and = Q for all t. Further, assuming no capital controls can
occur at any t, it is clear that the cotrauodity and asset demands at
(t + 1) are identical with those at t. Hence, P^ = ^t+1' ^t ~ ^t+1'
*
But, from (10), for ^ ( ) is indeterminate; hence, any constant
exchange rate yields an equilibrium time path. (Note that this exchange
rate does not (necessarily) depend on real variables, or nominal asset
supplies). This is the essence of the Kareken-Wallace argument.
Now, let us introduce governments into the model; the only function
we permit theia is the imposition of capital controls. By capital con
trols we mean the following: residents of each country are permitted to
hold only domestic currency. Thus, U*S. residents currently holding marks
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are obliged to swap them for either goods or dollars (at a raarket-deter-
mined rate), and German residents holding dollars are likewise obliged to
swap these dollars for goods or marks.Furthermore, we assume that
the imposition of controls is determined randomly and the public knows
the probability distribution used by governments. We denote the
probability that controls will be implemented in any period by it so that
the probability of no controls is (1-it) . This probability is time in
dependent - i.e., the probability of controls at (t+1) is independent of
occurrences at t, and is the same for all periods.
As is clear from the above description, the system outlined above is
•k
also stationary providing tt does not change through time. Thus, call e^
the equilibrium exchange rate at t if there are no controls, and e^ the
equilibrium exchange rate if controls are present at t. Since the pre
sence (or absence) of controls at t does not affect aggregate demand or
expectations at (t+1), it follows that the equilibrium exchange rate at
(t+1), - if no controls are present - must be the same as that at
t: hence, ~ similar logic, Therefore, from (10),
it is clear that e^ must equal e^. Suppose otherwise; ii e^ > e^ = ®t+l*
then next period*s dollar value of the mark can be no higher, and may be
lower (if controls are imposed), Chan its current value; hence, no one
•k
will hold marks (if capital mobility is allowed) and e^ must fall (relative
to e ). Similarly, if e < e , no one would willingly hold dollars,
t t t
Thus, e = e for all t, whether or not controls are present in any
period; consequently, P - the dollar price of goods - is also time inde
pendent. As a result, the marginal (average) propensity to consume will
be identical in the two countries. Finally, when capital controls are
present, asset market equilibrium for each currency requires:
tl
(18) (1 - c*)P-Q = D
(1 - c*)P-Q = ^
(i.e., demand for wealth in each country equals supply, since only
domestic currency may be held).
From (18):
(19) e=(§
M
I).
/
and the equilibrium exchange rate is determinate and responds conven
tionally to asset supplies and real economic variables.
To summarize the results of this section, we have seen that - if no
controls are possible - the exchange rate is constant and indeterminate.
In essence, since neither asset represents a claim on any particular set
of goods, its price is simply determined by self-fulfilling expectations.
However, we have also seen that this result is a singular one; the
smallest probability of controls renders the exchange rate determinate,
its value being determined in a way consistent with the Monetary Approach,
Since it seems rather implausible to attach a zero probability to any
event (particularly when governments are involved), the Kareken-Wallace
indeterminacy result stands out as a theoretical curiousity.
The model we have used so far is a stationary one in which the
equilibrium exchange rate was constant. In the next section we introduce
output uncertainty in order to examine exchange rate determination when
real factors may change over time.
Ill) Uncertainty, Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Determination
In general, the introduction of time-dependent variables into the
model otulined in (I) will not alter the Kareken-Wallace conclusion that
the equilibrium exchange rate is constant - but indeterminate (in the
12
absence of capital controls). For example, suppose =1, but = 0^,
0 1; since no uncertainty is present, a rational expectations solution
requires as can be seen from (10). For, if (since
the model is determinate, there is no probability distribution associ
ated with then no one will hold D, whereas if ^
will hold M. Thus, even if the two countries have divergent growth
rates, the rational expectations solution requires the constancy - and
indeterminacy - of the exchange rate.
Similarly, if each country's output is subject to random distur
bances, it can be seen from (10) that = e^ for all t remains a
g
solution for the exchange rate path. Hence, even though the model is
no longer determinate - i.e., is not known at t even though its
probability distribution is - the exchange rate path is determinate.
To this framework we now add the possibility that capital controls
may be imposed at any period t (the imposition of controls at t does not
imply controls will also exist at (t+1)), and ask how the possibility
of controls at (t+1) affects the equilibrium exchange rate at t. In
section II we saw that this possibility rendered the exchange rate
determinate - and constant; note, however, that the equilibrium exchange
rate determined there depended upon the relative outputs of the two
countries. Since we now take output to be random, it is clear that the
equilibrium exchange rate (path) can not be a constant one, as relative
outputs may change through time. Thus, the system is no longer autono
mous, and the equilibrium exchange rate will vary over time (depending
on the probability of controls and on the realized values of the random
variables).
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Assume that output in each country follows a Markov process:
(20) E(Xj^) = 1, Var(Xj) > 0.
*^t+l ~ ^t+l'^t* ~ Var(Xj^) > 0.
In (20), we assume are Identically, but Independently distributed;
similarly, for j)- By analogy to our previous discussion,
since relative outputs vary over time, it is clear that - even if
exchange controls are imposed next period - the exchange rate that will
then prevail is not known ex ante, but it will depend on '
Since at t, known, and since the distributions of (X, A) are
known, it follows that the exchange rate at t (if no controls exist)
should depend upon I" the remainder of this section, we show
how the exchange rate depends upon relative productivity (Q^/Q^), the
probability of capital controls (it), individual attitudes towards risk,
and the variability of the output disturbances.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to further characterize the
equilibrium exchange rate without specifying the utility function and
the distribution of the disturbances. In order to illustrate exchange
rate determination, we provide some specific examples. First, we assume
that the disturbances (X» X) have identical - but independent - binomial
distributions. i?or positive e less than unity, we let X and \ take on
values of (1 - e) and (1 + e) with probability 0.5. Define
"^t+l ^t+l^^t+1 AE (1 + e)/(l - e). Thus:
'^ t+i Wt W
f -1
A with probability .25
Yj. with probability .5
with probability .25
9Next, we assume the individual's preferences are given by:
(22) U(C,B) = • (C-B)P''^ ; p <1, p^ 0.
P ^
« InC + InB; p « 0.
fc'
lA
Hence U is homogeneous of degree p (and hence homothetic); the degree
of relative risk aversion is given by (p-1).
The specification given in (22) implies that the elasticity of
substitution between consumption goods is IJ as can be seen from (9) and
(10):
(23) c* =1/2, or cj = (Q^/2)
The individual consumes one-half of current output, selling the remaining
half to provide for future consumption. The remaining question, then,
is the consumer's portfolio decision (as determined by (10)). That
decision depends upon current prices Pj.) expectations of future
prices * these, in turn, depend upon the behavioral rules
followed by individuals in (t+1).
As argued earlier, the exchange rate at (t+1) should depend on
* c
and asset supplies (D/M). Let m (T, tt) denote the share of
wealth the individual believes others will allocate to marks (M); by
rationality, this should reflect the true decision rules individuals
will follow. Denote the exchange rate that will prevail if no capital
controls prevail next period (t+1) by (17') J
(24) «t+i(\+r =
Since is unknown, it follows that next period's exchange rate -
even if no controls are imposed - is unknown. From (16), the distribution
N
of ~ assuming no controls, is
(25)
If no controls are present at (t), the behavioral rule - m (y^» ~
N Nwill be the same as above, since tt is time-autonomous. Hence, e^,
are given by (24)-(25), with all time dimensions lagged one period.
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If controls are present at (t+1), then individuals born at (t+1)
can hold only domestic currencies; hence, the exchange rate
the event of controls is:
(26) = Yt+i(D/H);
and connnodity prices - in dollars (D) - are:
/
(27)
t+1
2D 2D
Given these expectations for (t+1), the individual chooses port
folio composition, assuming Q^, P^, are known. From (10), for an
interior solution,ra^ is chosen so that:
N
(28) (1-it) E U.
t+1
+ ttE U.
/ c
' e ..-e
't+1
\ t+1 / J
= 0.
Finally,, since all agents are identical and rational, the decisions of
this agent must be identical with those of his peers; hence, the deci-
i *sion rule = m (Yj tr). Substitution into (28), using (22)-(27) and
(6) yields:
(29) (1
1+Y/
* yX *(m C ir) - m (Y))
- l)
+ ttElW"
*
m (y)
In (29), we drop the time subscript; y the current value of Q/Q;
YAhence, at (t+1), ~ x * expectation runs over (X, X).
Since the distribution of X, X is discreet, so is the (ex ante)
distribution for y; i.e., at any t, y can achieve the values {y A^},
for i in the range (-t, t) where Yq is the initial value of Y. Thus,
yields a second order difference equation, which is solvable (at
= 0.
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least, by computer techniques). Let define ra^Cft) to be
m(A^, it) - i.e., the fraction of wealth held In marks when y=A^. Then,
from (29)
(30) (I-tt) E f A+Xy
A i+Y )" •-(4)] - m(Y)E A+Ayl-hfj
-Ap/2
.tNp/2-ttE ^
_ X+yA/V '^^ '
For ir=0, m(4)=m(Y), and the indeterminacy returns, for n?^0, we have
a second order difference equation, and presumably two degrees of free
dom. However, we shall show there is a unique solution consistent with
the condition me[0,l]; for 7r=l, it is clear the solution is unique.
For convenience, let I.e., d^ is the fractipn of wealth held
in dollars when y=A^. Then, for p=0 (30) becomes:
(31) -(l-TT)d^_^^ + 2(l+7T)d^ - (l-rr)d,_^ 47tE
A+A^A
= Tl^ +
l+A" 1+A
i-1
+
l+A
i+1
In general, for pt^O:
/ 1+A^"'"^\^^^(32) -(l-7r)d^_^_^^"'" J^ +d^ (i-hT)-(i-rr) (l+A '^'^ )
- ttR.
1
p/2
i^) (1+A '^^ ^)+|
A^.i+l\p/2
-(l-TT)d^_^|^
+
1+A
i-1
A+A'
1+A^
= TT
1+A
i+1
p/2
Since (31) is a second order, constant coefficient difference equation,
it is possible to find the analytic solution; of course, there are two
degrees of freedom in specifying this solution. Let d(Y=l)=dQ, d(Y=A)=dj^;
then, it is readily shown that the solution to (31) is:^^
i\p/2l
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(33) d, =
where
f^);
\ i-\I^/
- 1/3^; S^, ^2 ars characteristic roots
R. H-^r + f-j- + ; R. + R. =4
1+A 1+A 1+A
From (33) and (34), after some manipulation:
(35) d^ + = 1 + (^1+^2^ (<^0 " ' i > 0.
But d^ e [0,1] for all i implies d^ E 1/2; otherwise, d^ diverges.
Furthermore, convergence of d^ as i " requires
o6> <»;S>
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Since decreases with i(l > 0), the limit exists. Hence, using
(33)-(36):
«i i-1
j'
k
(37) di =-^ +^ (Si - ^2 ^ i i ^5
K = lim ^
k->oo j=i J
(38) +d_^ =l; dg =1/2; d, =(^) + K
Consequently, for ir > 0, there is a unique exchange rate solution; the
actual exchange rate at any time depends on the state of the system
(\
V /Q^/ 3nd the probability (ir) of capital controls. Note that if
capital controls are not present at a period, the equilibrium exchange
rate is:
18
whereas if capital controls are present at that period:
' c
(AO) e (y, 7t) = y(t)
In Tables 1 and 2, we present the values of the proportionate demand for
dollars (d) and the dollar price of marks (e ) for various values of y>
IT, and A assuming chat p = 0. Note that an increase in Y reflects an
increase in German productivity relative to that of the U.S., and an
13
increase in A reflects greater variability of output disturbances. To
ascertain the effects of output variability on the demand for dollars,
2
consider — for example — a value of y - (1.1) « so that Germany is
1,21 times as "productive" as the U.S., and a tt of 0.1. For a
A= (1.1)*^, the demand for dollars (as a percent of wealth) would be
.A5262 by both U.S. and German residents. Increasing output variability
to A = 1.1 would change d to .45300, so that increasing output varia
bility would increase the demand for the currency of the less productive
country (the U.S. in this example, since y > 1.0). Examination of
Table 2 indicates that the rate of exchange would change from 1.20935J |
to 1.20750J J: increasing output variability would act to depreciate
\ M /
the currency of the more productive country (Germany in this example).
Comparing these rates to that of the case in which capital is immobile —
the column entitled "Current Controls" — shows that the value of currency
of the more productive country is lower when capital is mobile than when
there are capital controls [1.21 (D/M) for this example].
To determine the effects of an increase in German productivity
relative to that of the U.S., holding output variability constant, let
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2
TT .1 and A « 1.1. If German productivity increases from (1.1) to
(1.1)^ times that of the U.S., the proportion of dollars in portfolios
falls from .45300 to .36221.^^ The main results illustrated in Tables
1 and 2 can be summarized as follows:
i) For i > 0 (i.e., y > 1) an increase in y acts to reduce the
demand for dollars. Thus, the exchange rate is responsive
to real factors in the conventional way; a relative increase
in foreign productivity (increase in y) will lead to a
depreciation of the domestic currency.
ii) Perhaps the most interesting result is the relative insensi-
tivity of d and e to "T; for "ff = 0, we have seen that d(Y) and
e(Y) is constant and indeterminate. For any ^ 0, d(Y) is
determinate and responsive to productivity; hetice, e(Y)
depends on both productivity and asset supplies. However,
note that, given tt > 0, the value of d(y) is relatively
insensitive to tt; for example, when delta = 1.1 and i = 6,
changing the probability of controls from .1 to unity only
changes the proportion of dollars in domestic and foreign
portfolios in the third decimal place. Hence, the important
issue seems to be not what is the probability of capital
controls, but whether this probability is zero or positive.
iii) As can be seen from (37), llm d(y) = (1/2), since 3-j^, ^2^^
TT^
f lltn ^ R\
yi->" j=l J
converges. Consequently, lim e(y) "= (D/M); this
TT-^-O
can be seen in Table 2. Thus, while the limiting solution to
(37) corresponds to a constant exchange rate, it is a deter
minate one that depends only on asset supplies.
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iv) For Y > 1, increases in ti lead to decreases in dCy) and hence
to a depreciation of the domestic currency (i.e., of the
currency of the less productive country). Since d^ + d_^ = 1,
for Y < 1» increases in tt lead to an appreciation of the
domestic (more productive) country*s currency.
v) For all "T, the (capital mobile) exchange rate
e(Y» '''^ ) ^ e^(Y) =7*( ] as y ~ 1* Hence, capital mobility
\nj
leads to an overvaluation of the less productive country's
currency relative to the exchange rate that would prevail if
holdings of foreign assets were banned. As we shall see in
section V, this creates incentives for the less productive
country to (occasionally) impose capital controls (choose u > 0)
vi) An increase in the variability of the disturbances to output
(A) , ceteris paribus, leads to an appreciation of the less
productive country's currency; i.e., the greater the degree
of uncertainty, the more "overvalued" that currency becomes
relative to the capital immobile exchange rate. This is
apparent from section II, since, for no variability (A= 1)»
any tt > 0 yields the same exchange rate as would current
capital controls; the greater risk leads to more portfolio
diversification.
Returning to (32), the case where p # 0, we notice we also have a
second order difference equation; however, since it is not a constant
coefficient one, we have not been able to obtain an anlaytic solution.
However, a computer simulation of (32) yields the characteristics of the
portfolio demands and equilibrium exchange rates as a function of p, y»
23
n and A. These results are presented in Tables 3 and A. As can be
seen from the tables, the characteristics of these solutions are com
parable to those discussed for the prior case; even for p = 1 (constant
marginal utility of income), the same qualitative results hold.^^ Also,
as can be seen from the tables, the larger is p (in algebraic value),
the less "overvalued" is the less productive country's currency. That
is, an increase in p (decrease in risk aversion) leads to an increase in
demand for the currency of the more productive country and hence to an
appreciation of that country's exchange rate. This result is not sur
prising, since it implies - in essence - that individuals demand less
of a risk premium in order to hold that currency.
That concludes our analysis of the effect of (possible) exchange
controls on the equilibrium exchange rate. It is particularly signifi
cant that the existence of the possibility of controls - rather than
their magnitude - is of fundamental importance. It is also important
to remember that - under uncertainty - the less productive country's
currency will be "overvalued". So far, we have offered no motivation
as to why controls might be employed (though perhaps motivation is
unnecessary in addressing government behavior); now we turn to that
issue. In section IV, we compare the expected utility of individuals
under fixed and flexible exchange rates, considering the case in which
no controls (it = 0) are possible and the case in which no capital
mobility (tt =• 1) is permitted. Section V then addresses the whole
remaining range in which controls occur randomly with a known probability
(0 < TT < 1) .
IV) Expected Utility Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate
We wish to compare expected utility for individuals under fixed
and flexible exchange rates. Before considering how the probability of
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capital controls affects expected utility in a flexible exchange rate
system, we first briefly discuss the two pure cases in which (i) there
is no chance of capital controls being imposed, or (ii) holdings of
foreign currency by private individuals are banned (no capital mobility).
As already noted, if the probability of capital controls is zero.,
fixed and flexible exchange rates are (essentially) identical» In
particular, the exchange rates will be constant under either regime, so
that the actual consumption path of individuals will be identical under
the two regimes (though, of course, the consumption path will depend on
the realized values of the random variables). Thus, in this rational
expectations framework, there is no difference between the two regimes.
On the other hand, if capital is immobile, then the two regimes are
not Identical, and hence will yield different expected utility.Under
either regime, first period consumption for domestic (foreign) citizens
is:
(41) = (Qj./2); = (q^/2)
Under flexible exchange rates with no capital mobility, the Balance of
Trade must be zero; in essence, individuals cannot transfer purchasing
power intertemporally (as a group). Thus, second period consumption,
for a person born at t, is:
(42) = Qj.^j^/2; Bj. = (Q^^^/2).
"k
Hence, utility under flexible exchange rates (denote by U ) is:
(43) U* = (2/p)
p/2
where the bar denotes the foreign country.
Under fixed exchange rates, second period consumption is given by:
P^.-(Qt/2) _ P^(Q^/2)
(44) B ' -7=; =^7 ; B «
t (P)t P^ ''^t+l' ^ ^t+1
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which, using (16) reduces to:
Letting U' denote utility under fixed exchange rates:
(46) U* = (2/p)
C-iT\¥)"X^T]U*t (2/p)
Comparing (46) and (43):
0/2* /Q, \p r/^+^Y, \(47) E[U' - U] =(2/p)^^^ j E J - (X)
where, in (47), the expectation is over A, X, given Q^, 7^- But,
assuming X and X are identically, but independently distributed, it is
readily shown that:^^
,T. \ P/2
(48)
/X+Xy\
V
p/2
- X
> 0, 0 < Y <
Thus, for any non-zero, finite y, the fixed exchange rate regime yields
a higher expected utility than is obtainable under a flexible exchange
18rate, no capital mobility regime. By symmetry, the same results hold
for residents of the foreign country.
In conclusion, we see that fixed and flexible exchange rates yield
identical expected utility if there is capital mobility, but that in the
absence of private capital mobility, fixed exchange rates dominate
flexible exchange rates. Consequently, residents of both countries will
want either a fixed exchange rate regime or, if flexible exchange rates
are permitted, will oppose absolute bans on foreign currency holdings.
This, however, does not imply that they will be opposed to some bans on
28
capital mobility. In particular, we show in the next section that some
probability of capital controls will increase expected utility for
residents of at least one country.
V) Probabilistic Controls and Expected Utility
While an absolute ban on capital controls is undesirable, it is
possible that the random imposition of controls may raise expected
utility, particularly for residents of the less productive country. The
reason for this stems from the fact that, as noted earlier, the less
productive country's currency tends to be overvalued. Hence, if at t,
controls are imposed, but no controls are present at (t+1), then the
residents of the less productive country are likely to experience capital
gains on their domestic currency holdings, whereas the residents of the
more productive country will experience capital losses. Consequently,
the use of controls at t - and their absence at (t+1) - will cause a
redistribution of consumption towards the (older) residents of the less
productive country, away from those of the other country. Therefore,
the probability of controls - particularly If this probability is small -
may increase expected utility.
Consider the consumption vector for an individual born at t; this
consumption vector will depend upon the realized levels of output, as
well as upon whether controls actually occur or not. As earlier, we
assume the probability of controls in any period is it , and that this
probability is independent of the state of the economy. The first period
consumption for this individual (of either country) is given by:
(A9) = Q^/2; C^ = Q^/2
If no controls are present at t, residents of each country will hold
both dollar (d) and mark (m) assets; total wealth holdings of domestic
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residents (in dollar units) will be which a fraction d(Y, tt)
will be held in dollars. Total foreign wealth holdings (in dollar units)
will be » of which the same fraction d(Y» tt) will be held in
dollars. Thus, next period's exchange rate will not alter the distribu
tion of wealth - or purchasing power - between these two groups. At
(t+1), aggregate consumption of the new generation will be f(Q^+l'^t+l^'
leaving a comparable amount for older residents to divide between them
selves, according to the share of wealth they possess. Consequently, if
no controls are present at t, consumption in (t+1) of the t— generation
will be:
(50) =
Note that this is identical with the fixed exchange rate consumption
vector; the probability of this event is simply (l-7i), since it is inde
pendent of the use of controls at (t+1).
On the other hand, if controls occur at (t) and (t+I), then - for
members of the t^^ generation - this is identical to a flexible exchange
2
regime with no capital mobility. The probability of this event is (tt ),
and the (t+1) consumption for members of generation t is:
(51) =. (Q^^^/2); . (Q^^^/2)
Finally, consider the case in which controls occur at t, but not at
(t+1) - the corresponding probability being •ir(l-7r). This is the case in
which wealth can be redistributed between the older generations of each
country. All older domestic residents hold dollars, while foreign citi
zens hold marks; hence, (t+1) consumption for the older generation is:
\ ''t+1
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Using (16) and (17*) yields:
(53) = (l-d(,^^^,
These consumption rules are sunimarized in Table 5.
Expected utility for domestic residents under flexible exchange
rates - with the probability tt of controls is
(54) U = (1-tt) E \J\_ 2 ' 2(1+7^) J
+ tt(1--^) E
2
+ TT E
»tt) '^
Hence, the difference between expected utility under flexible and fixed
exchange rates is given by:
(55) J = Vi
2 ' 2
* r r r /U - U' = tt/ttE U( • + (1-it)E
1- E w^y_ ^ 2 ' 2(1+Tj.) j
Similarly, for foreign residents:
(56) J = U - U' = TT- ttE
L L
u
2 * 2
+ (l-rT)E
- E 2 ' 2(1+y^)
For the log case (p = 0) (55) and (56) reduce to:
t+l^d(Y
(55') J=7T ^E[ln(l+Y )] + (1-tt)E
"
J = TT • E In ( ]
^ v \ /
ln(d[T^^^, tt]) - ttE
"("+ (l-TT)E[ln(l-d( it))] - ttE
At TT = 0, J = J = 0. From (55'):
(57')
Sir E[ln(l+Y^.) ]+(l-TT)E[ln(d(Yj.^^, tt)) ]-¥E
-fTrj^-E Ln •3d,3tt^\+1' tt)
—\
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Now, as TT^O, d(Y it) 1/2; and Od/Sir) approaches a finite limit,
t+i
Hence,
(57") limff = [E(ln(l+Y^)) - ln2]
tt-K)
At t, if ^ 1, this limit is positive. Ex ante, if the initial value
of T(Yq) is the distribution of Is given by:
aI'^s
(58) = A
t — g V V
with probability: g(s) = 2 ^ f ^ ]
k=0 I (k!(t-k)!(k+ls|)!(t-k-|s|)y
where sG[~t,t]. Clearly, g(s) = g(-s). Hence, ex ante:
jv t . t
(59) lira -^ = (ln(l+A'-*^®).g(s)) - ln2 ; - 1
ir-K) s=-t -t
By sytometry:
t
5
TI-»-0 " " S=1
and:
(60) Ind+A"""^®) + ln(l+A^"®) > 21n(l+A^) , A 1, s # 0. Hence:
(61) lira >-f ln(l+A^) [g(o)+2Vg(s)] - ln2~l
^-.0 C ^1 J
= ln(l+A^) - ln2 ^0, i ^ 0.
Thus, from an ex ante perspective, if Yq >. 1> then increasing it from
zero can increase expected utility for any future generation of the
domestic country; by symmetry, if <1, lim( ^ ) > 0, and - again from
° /
an ex ante perspective - some tt > 0 will yield a higher expected utility
for any future generation of the foreign country.
Economically, this says that if the countries currently have equal
outputs, then both countries will choose some tt > 0 in order to increase
expected utility of future generations. It also follows from the above
(59') lira H =ln(l+A^)g(o) + [Ind+A^"^®) + ln(l+A^"®)]g(s) - ln2;
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analysis that governments may wish to rethink - or reshape - their
policy towards controls depending upon the current state of the world
economy. As can be seen from the prior analysis, the larger is the
current y, the more desirable controls become for the (domestic) less
productive country, whereas the less desirable they become for the
(foreign) more productive country. Hence, even if they agree upon a
particular system (value of tt) ex ante, they will wish to change their
20
minds at some later date; and conflicts may develop between the
countries concerning the desirability - or legitimacy - of employing
controls.
While the case p ^ 0 is considerably more complicated, a similar
analysis shows that the expected utility of the current domestic genera
tion can be increased by increasing tt above zero > 1; for
3J~ = 0 at IT = 0. In other words, if the government is concerned only
with the expected utility of the current generation (for example, due to
electoral considerations), then the less productive country will have an
incentive to choose a positive probability for imposing controls.
However, unlike the log case, it is not possible to infer from this that
the ex ante expected utility of any future generation will also be
increased for some positive tt.
Since we were not able to derive analytic results, we once again
turned to a simulation. Specifically, we have calculated the differences
between the expected utility under flexible and fixed exchange rates
(using the true probability distribution) as a function of tt. The
magnitude and sign of this difference will depend not only on but
also on: i) the degree of risk aversion (p); ii) the relative produc
tivity of the economies (y); iii) the planning horizon of policymakers -
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the number of future generations policy makers consider; and iv) the
variability of the output disturbances (A). To ascertain the effects of
risk aversion on the desirability of capital controls, consider the case
in which countries are equally productive (y^l), policymakers are
willing to look twenty periods into the future, and A=l.l. Simulation
results for this case are given in Table 6. As the numbers in the table
indicate, for any degree of risk aversion there exists a flexible
exchange rate system with a positive probability of capital controls
that policy makers (looking twenty generations into the future) in both
countries will prefer to either fixed exchange rates or flexible rates
with no controls. Further, as risk aversion increases, the desirability
of capital controls also increases, i.e., higher optimal values of are
associated with greater degrees of risk aversion.
The situation changes if both countries are not equally productive.
As shown in Table 7, the less productive country will always desire a
positive probability of capital controls while the more productive
country will favor no controls. The figures in Table 7 are for p=0,
^1.1, and policy makers looking twenty periods into the future. In
all cases, the more productive country will prefer a fixed rate to a
flexible rate with controls. However, the less productive country will
always favor a positive probability of capital controls: as productivity
declines, the greater the optimal probability of controls. It is
remarkable that if Germany is (1.1)^ —or approximately 61% —more
productive than the U.S., the U.S. wil prefer a 30% probability of
capital controls to no controls or a fixed exchange rate.
Table 8 indicates that the longer the planning horizon of policy
makers, the greater the beneficial effects of capital controls for the
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TABLE 6
EXPECTED UTILITY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FLEXIBLE AND FIXED RATES
DELTA = 1.1, y = 1.0, TWENTY PERIOD FUTURE
Degrees of Risk Aversion; p
Probability
of Controls .5 0.0 -.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
.001 1.4819 X10~^ 6.1040 X lO"^ 1.6311 X lO"^
.005 2.5819 X10*^ 1.2245 X 10"^ 3.4736 X10"^
.01 2.0394 X10"^ 1.2910 X10~^ 3.9194 X lO"^
.05 -8.5758 X10"^ -5.1256 XlO"^ 1.1027 X 10'^
.1 -2.3298 X10~^ -3.3187 X lO"^ -3.9575 X10"^
.2 -5.3116 X 10"^ -9.0751 X 10~^ -1.4487 X lO"^
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TABLE 8
EXPECTED UTILITY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FLEXIBLE AND FIXED RATES;
RHO = 0; DELTA = 1.1, y = 1.0
Probability
of Controls 1
Periods of Planning Horizon
10 20
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
.0001 4.4958 X 10"® 4.9994 X10"^ 9.9988 X 10~^
.001 7.6384 X io-« 2.9528 X10"^ 6.1040 X 10"^
.005 -1.3725 X 10"^ 5.1513 X10"^ 1.2245 X 10-^
.01 -3.8634 X 10-^ 4.1925 X10"^ 1.2910 X 10"^
.05 -2.6110 X 10"^ -1.59821 X10"^ -5.1256 X 10-^
TABLE 9
EXPECTED UTILITY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FLFJCIBLE AND FIXED RATES
RHO = 0.0, y = 1.0, TWENTY PERIOD FUTURE
Probability
of Controls 1.1
Delta
1.21
0.0 0.0 0.0
.0001 9.9989 X 10-' 4.2018 X 10-^
.001 6.1040 X 10-^ 3.4279 X 10-5
.005 1,2245 X 10'^ 1.0650 X 10"^
.01 1.2916 X 10-s 1.4822 X 10"^
.05 -5.1256 X 10"^ 1.7129 X 10-^
.1 -3.3187 X 10"^ 8.2309 X 10-5
,2 -9.0751 X 10-5 -1.4226 X 10"^
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less productive country. Note, in particular, that even if only the
current working generation is considered [i.e., the length of the
planning period is one], some positive probability of capital controls
will be desirable even if countries are equally productive. Table 9
indicates that the greater the variability of the output disturbance,
the greater the desirability of capital controls.
In closing this section, let us briefly summarize our results. We
have shown - rather surprisingly, we think - that probabilistic capital
controls will always appear desirable to at least one country. This, in
turn, completes the motivation for our earlier sections in which we
showed that the existence of such controls creates a determinate exchange
rate. Furthermore, we have shown that the attitude of any country
towards controls will depend upon its economic situation vis—a—vis the
rest of the world; the weak countries will (rationally) prefer controls,
the stronger ones oppose them. This, inevitably, poses conflicts between
these governments, ones we have not pursued here. Finally, a country s
attitude towards controls may change over time as it finds its economic
position changing. Previously strong (productive) countries that had
opposed controls may find their position shifting as their economic
position deteriorates. There is nothing irrational in a change in such
attitudes due to changing economic conditions.
VI) Conclusion
Our principal result in this paper has been to show that a deter
minate exchange rate path exists even if agents have rational expectations
The Kareken-Wallace conclusion that the exchange rate is constant - but
indeterminate - is implausable and seems inconsistent with observed
behavior. We have demonstrated that even the smallest probability of
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controls renders the exchange rate determinate and responsive in tradi
tional ways to asset supplies and relative productivity.
As a by-product of this analysis, we have also shown that such
controls are not irrational, but may well increase expected utility for
at least one country. Hence, it is not appropriate to argue that capital
controls interfere with the behavior of private individuals and therefore
lower their expected utility.
The paper raises as many questions as it answers. Further inves
tigation could entail extending the analysis to a multi-country, or
multi-commodity framework. In addition, since conflicts arise between
the desires of the governments for controls, it would seem worthwhile
to attempt to model this conflict. Moreover, since - from the perspec
tive of each country - the optimal probability for any period will
depend on relative productivities, it would be desirable to attempt to
model this phenomenon, under the (rational expectations) assumption that
economic agents are aware of the policy rule used by governments. In
short, we believe that the approach presented here provides fruitful
ideas for further research.
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FOOTNOTES
^Respectively, the authors are Professor and Associate Professor of
Economics at Iowa State University. This material is based upon work
supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Soc - 7907066.
We would like to thank the National Science Foundation for this support.
^The relationship between currency substitution and exchange rates
was first rigorously analyzed by Boyer (1972) and Girton and Roper (1976).
2
We defer discussion of the institutional setting in which capital
controls are imposed until Section I. It should be noted that the quali
tative nature of our results will hold as long as governments probabil
istically impose policies that discriminate between national monies.
3
While somewhat awkward, this notation allows us to avoid two time
subscripts - one for the generation, the other for the period in which
consumption takes place.
^The motivation for why they may wish to exercise these controls
will be taken up in Sections IV and V; for now, we analyze the positive
aspect of these controls - i.e., how they would affect exchange rates.
^Laws banning (or restricting) domestic holdings of foreign currency
are not uncommon; those banning foreigners from holding domestic currency
are less common, but do exist. The latter ban could be enforced, for
example, by issuing new currency in place of the old to domestic citizens
only. Of course, as with any law,enforcement is not guaranteed, but
that is not our problem here.
^It would be a bit more desirable, perhaps, to assume the ban
applies only to domestic holding of foreign assets, and to assume each
government may (independently) impose such controls. This alternative
would make little difference in this section; however, the analysis for
the subsequent section would be greatly complicated. However, the
qualitative conclusions that the possibility of such controls makes the
exchange rate determinate, and dependent on asset supplies and real
variables (in conformity with standard models) would be unaltered.
^If each government can impose controls, then (l-ir) is the proba
bility neither government imposes controls
g
We have not been able to prove that this is the only solution for
all utility functions, but we believe that to be the case.
q
Clearly, other forms exist for homogeneous utility functions;
however, this specification has the simplicity that c* - the MFC - is
constant. Without this assumption, we have not been able to find
analytic solutions.
^^Obviously, the rational expectations solution must be an interior
one if ir > 0, since, in the event of controls, 0 < ""J hence,
0 < e^ < Implying interior solutions.
For n =1, d. = -y
i tj
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+ ^ +
1+A^ 1+A^ ^
e(y A^) = A^(A-fl)^+A^^(3AV2A+3)+4A^^"^^
4A+ 3aV2A '^^ V3A^"*"^+A^^(A+1)^
, so
Thus, even for Tr=l, the less productive country's currency will be over
valued relative to the exchange rate that would prevail if no capital
movements were possible this period.
12 For Tr=0, (31) yields d^=aQ+a^t, since f^^=32=l; again, d^e[0,l]->-a^=0;
hence, for tt=0, but is indeterminate - once again, the case of
self-fulfilling expectations.
13 Since (31) provides the solution d^, it gives the demand for
dollars when y=A^. Consider an alternative economic system where A'= A^;
then the corresponding solution for dollar demands d^ corresponds to a
Y=(A*)^=A^^. To ask how variability of the disturbances affects the fraction
of wealth held in dollars is Co ask how - for the same y - an increase
in Aaffects d. Hence, if we compare d2^(Y=A ) to d'^ (Y=(A*) =A ),
then we can ascertain how the increase in A, holding y constant, affects
portfolio demand.
14
The authors have calculated all values to twelve significant
digits; however, for space consideration, we present no more than six
significant digits. Further, the results are presented only for
Y>1(y=A^, i>0), since d(l/Y) = l-d(Y); (d^+d
^^Note that since it is really price uncertainty - not income or
wealth uncertainty - that is involved here, it is not surprising that
"risk neutrality" - as defined by constant marginal utility of income -
yields qualitatively similar results Co the case of risk aversion. Even
with risk neutrality, we still have diminishing marginal utility for
each commodity.
noted by Helpman and Razin, this creates a fundamental asymmetry
in comparing the two regimes, since, under fixed rates, the central bank
will be holding foreign currency, whereas under flexible exchange rates,
no agent holds foreign currency.
^^Identical results hold for the log case in which p^O.
18
"Note that as Y"*"®» the fixed exchange rate regime corresponds to
the case in which the home country is infinitessimal; in this case,
fixed and flexible yield identical expected utility. As Y"K), the foreign
country becomes infinitessimal, so that, from the perspective of the
home country, fixed and flexible exchange rates are logically equivalent.
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The proof is omitted to save space; details will be supplied by
the authors upon request.
20
Of course, if the tt chosen depends on y» the analysis presented
here does not reflect rational expectations by agents, since they have
not internalized this. Nevertheless, policy decisions - or changes -
are not always capable of being predicted ex ante. The main point is
simply that the desire to change it arises because of the actual reali
zations of output.
A3
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